Timing attack
A side-channel attack that infers secrets from how long operations take, such as a comparison that returns at the first wrong byte of a MAC, token or password hash (CWE-208). Compare secrets with a constant-time function such as hmac.compare_digest, crypto.timingSafeEqual or MessageDigest.isEqual.
- Also called
- timing side channel
- Defined in
- MITRE CWE-208
- Identifiers
- CWE-208: Observable timing discrepancy
Covered in
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A sourced quick reference for October 2026: which algorithm and parameters to use for encryption, hashing, passwords, MACs, signatures, key agreement, key derivation, randomness and TLS, the matching APIs in Node.js, Python, Java, Go and .NET, and where post-quantum migration stands.
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Practice: Webhook signature and replay lab: Repair a webhook handler that pays twice · Insecure randomness lab: Generate unguessable API keys